EuphratesForceV01
TimBarnes
2009/07/26 18:54

Table of Contents

Euphrates diversion
In order to divert Turkish forces and also change the nature of the Ctesiphon defence, we will send a Division up the Euphrates to take the Shia holy city of Kerbala, take the rail-head and bypass the Ctesiphon defences to attack Baghdad.
Alas, there are no spare divisions however the key is the belief that there is a force going up the Euphrates.
We will land what appears to be a Division at Basra, send it up to Nasiriyah to replace the 12th Division and then proceed up the Euphrates.
The “Division” at Basra will be the 38th Brigade from the 10th Division in Egypt, a division that has no British units, limited equipment and in poor shape. By sneaking out extra troops to the troopship, dressing the crew as soldiers and sneaking troops back on the ship (in cargo or disguised as port hands unloading the ship or injured troops loading up) we can simulate a whole division and we can guarantee that this information will soon reach Baghdad.
When the 38th gets to Nasiriyah, the 4th Rajputs with a Maxim Gun Btty and the 33rd Ind Light Cavalry Rgt with 2 paddle steamers will impersonate the 10th Division going north.
This unit will avoid battle but otherwise impersonate a the vanguard of a full division. To counter this threat, the Turks will have to divert at least a brigade and probably a division to cover the Euphrates. As they have limited communications, we will cut the telegraph wires to Baghdad to maintain concern about the thrust from this direction.
If a division is sent, there will either be no reserves in Baghdad or reduced forces at ctisiphon. A single brigade sent down the Ctisiphon will likely leave more reserves at Baghdad thus reducing the forces at Ctisiphon. Moreover, it raises the risk that retreat from Ctisiphon might be straight into the Euphrates force.
The second part of this plan is leverage to mobilise the Shia arabs in Mesopotamia. We will badger and cajole the arabs to provide troops to support the mission (this will involve some subterfuge on our part). The threat of an arab uprising will add further uncertainty, potentially draw off more forces and also undermine confidence in the arab militias.
We will also acquire a nominal division (useful?) and can free up the 12th Brigade to assist in the battle of Ctisiphon.
The 38th will be retrained for further actions in this theatre.